Abstract. This issue examines the executive compensation structure of 828 non-financial U.S. firms, providing the evidence which supports incentive compensation. This issue shows that the total compensation level positively affects firm performance, as measured by Tobin's Q and ROA. Different from the prior empirical research, this issue represents that not all the type of equity-based compensation motivates the top managers to increase firm value. The empirical results reveal that stock options have no effect on corporate performance, while restricted stocks have significantly positive influence on firm performance. Thus, the firm should be critical thinking when using equity-based compensation. Also, the major compensation type, salary, has a passive effect on firm performance. Finally, the authors find that the link between compensation structure and corporate performance is stronger than the link between total compensation level and corporate performance. That means compensation structure provide more incentives for executives to maximise firm value.
Introduction
The discussion topics around executive compensation that whether there exists the link between firm performance and executive compensation is still unclear. The debate over executive compensation raises questions such as "How much are the CEOs paid?" and "Who is the highest paid CEO?" (Jensen & Murphy, 1990a) . However, there are more significant problems with executive compensation, and a highly focus on how much the executives are compensated shifts the public attention to the real issue: "How the CEOs are paid" (Jensen & Murphy, 1990a) . Although executive compensation only represents a small part of the total firm value, a well-designed executive compensation plan will not only attract, retain and motivate CEO and top management but also have a significant effect on the added value that the top managers bring to the firm.
A mass of empirical studies has investigated the level of compensation with corporate performance. Research on executive compensation have been done more than 70 years and has added up to 300 studies in 1998. The focus on this pay-performance relationship mainly based on the following two theories: The tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) and the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Firstly, in tournament theory, Lazear and Rosen (1981) suggest that the accessible chance of promotion motivates individuals to get a higher salary in the firm. In reality, executives are compensated with a very large amount of revenue, which can be used as a tool to promote lower-level managers to pursue a higher promotion. Secondly, in agent theory, Jenson and Meckling (1976) suggest that agent problems are mainly caused by a separation between ownership and management, especially for the firm where top managers operate a company as the representative of shareholders. Since managers have the incentive to pursue private gain, their decision and actions may not maximize the shareholder value. Therefore, to make the managers pursue the maximization of shareholder's wealth, firms can design the compensation contracts which can partly link the interests of shareholders and the managers. Equity-based compensation, such as stock options and restricted stocks, ties executive's interest to shareholder's interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . If the firm designs compensation contracts more equity-based, managers will tend to maximize firm value (Fama and Jensen, 1983) .
Methodology Sample
The sample consists of 828 public listed non-financial companies in U.S. for the period 2008-2014. Executive compensation data were obtained from COMPUSTAT database, and financial data were obtained from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). In order to keep the objectivity and accuracy of my analysis, Financial Services and some inactive companies are also dropped from the panel database, due to financial ratios and valuation methods for these institutions are not directly comparable with other firms.
Choice of Method
This research makes use of panel data methodology to investigate the incentive effects of compensation structure. Himmelberg et al. (1999) stated that the contract environment faced by the firm differs both in observable and unobservable ways. The fixed effect model assumes that unobservable effects to be fixed for all the firms and not random. In addition, panel data is used to investigate the relationship which is correlated with both observable and unobservable factors affecting compensation contracts. If the unobservable factors of the firm and heterogeneity are constant during some time period, then these unobservable variables can be treated fixed-effects, and one can use panel data methodology to gain consistently estimated coefficients of the parameter (Himmelberg et al. 1999 ). Palia (2001) suggested that running cross-section regressions does not control for firm's unobservable contracting environment which gives a different relationship when the model is using panel data. Therefore, this issue investigates the fixed-effect regression model in order to control firm and executive heterogeneity. Finally, endogeneity is another concern when testing the relationship between firm performance and compensation. It is hard to define which comes first, firm performance or compensation. Therefore, in this research, I focus on examining whether compensation can be used to add firm value and reduce agent problem.
Model
The first hypothesis tested in this study is H1: the total executive compensation level positively affects firm performance and provides the incentive for executives to increase firm value. To test this hypothesis, equation one is used to testing the link between firm performance and total compensation level and control variables.
Firm Performance it = β1Clit-1 +β2LEVit-1+ β3Brit-1 +β4SIZEit-1 +∑ y Industry +∑y Year +uit-1
(1) (i=1, 2, ..., N; t =1, 2, ..., T)
The second hypothesis is H2: the equity-based compensation (e.g., stock and options) provide positive incentives for top executives to increase their firm performance. To test the second hypothesis, equation 2 describes the incentive effect of executive compensation structure and control variables.
Firm Performance it = β1Csit-1 +β2LEVit-1+ β3BR it-1 +β4SIZEit-1+β4SIZE*CL it-1+∑ y Industry +∑y Year +uit-1 (2) (i=1, 2, ..., N; t =1, 2, ..., T) Note: I represent U.S. firms and t represents the time during 2008-2014; Firm performance is measured both in Tobin's Q and return on assets (ROA); CL is the average total compensation level received by an executive; CS represents the compensation structure of an executive; LEV is the firm leverage, BR is firm-specific risks and SIZE is firm size measured by the logarithm of total assets. All of them will be introduced as control variables; the interaction term SIZE*CL is to measure the effect of firm's economic scale on executive compensation; the industry dummy controls the effect of different industry groups and year dummy control year effect; uit-1 is the time-varying error term; compensation variables are the average of total compensation paid to the 5 top managers reported in the annual proxy statement.
Measurement of Variables
Compensation structure. A large number of empirical literature investigated the link between compensation structure and firm performance. For example, Mehran (1995) measured the cash compensation as the ratio of salary plus bonus to total compensation, and he also measured equitybased compensation as the ratio of the stock option granted to total compensation. Similarly, to investigate the effect of each form of compensations to firm performance, the compensation structure in this research is measured as each form of compensation divided by total compensation: (1) The ratio of total compensation in grants of option-related awards. (2) The ratio of total compensation that is in the value of the restricted stock. (3) The ratio of total compensation in salary (4) The ratio of total compensation in bonus (5) The ratio of total other compensation, including Debt Forgiveness, Imputed Interest, and Payouts for cancellation of stock options et al. This research uses total compensation paid to top executives reported in the annual proxy statement by U.S. firms.
Firm performance. There is a numerous empirical literature widely using the accounting return as a basis for executive compensation. The reason why using ROA (return of asset) is that the accounting returns are significantly important to determine top managers' compensation which is more closely tied to the firms' accounting return than its stock returns [Jenson and Murphy (1990b)]. The research of Sloan (1993) stated the accounting based performance measures are the useful mechanism in executive compensation packages. However, some literature argues that accounting return (such as ROA) transfer little information about the economic rate of return (Benston, 1985) . Accounting returns are found to be short-term oriented measures for capturing firm's overall financial performance. Thus, many kinds of literature have argued to use Tobin's Q which is theoretically tied to total economic return on investment (Landsman and Shapiro, 1995).Therefore, to reflect both accounting performance measures and the shareholders' future expectations on the firm, Tobin's Q is employed to explain some diverse firm phenomena.
Empirical Results

Results Hypothesis 1
The first main objective of this issue is to test the link between total compensation level and firm performance based on tournament theory. According to the previous discussion, it assumes that executives are awarded for future firm success. Therefore, I base the conclusion on the simultaneous models that examine a lagged relationship between firm performance and compensation in order to reduce potential endogeneity. All the independent variables and the control variables are lagged for one year in the model. Table 1 shows the fixed-effect regression to test whether the total compensation level is positively related to firm performance. The results of the fixed-effect regression model are consistent in all two models, which indicate a robust model. Both of Tobin's Q and ROA models show significant positive results at 0.10% level. The regression results provide the evidence that an increase in total compensation positively affects firm performance. According to tournament theory, high compensation level will promote lower-level managers to pursue high revenue, who will try their best to work hard to climb high positions in the company. Therefore, the empirical results support the first hypothesis that an increase in compensation level provides a correct incentive for top managers to increase firm value and have a positive influence on firm performance. lagged total executive compensation; L.LEV: lagged firm leverage ratio as measured by firm's long-term debt divided by total assets; BR: lagged firm specific risk as measured by the standard deviation of ROA during 3 years; SIZE: lagged firm size as measured by the nature logarithm of total assets. T statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Results Hypothesis 2
The second main objective is to investigate the incentive effects of compensation structure on firm performance based on agency theory. By using the different combination of the ratio of five compensation components respectively, I aim to find that whether a more equity-based compensation results in a higher firm performance. Firstly, four models have tested a simultaneous relationship; results are in table 2. Overall, four models are significant and have R-square values ranging from 14.20% to 14.00%.
Salary, Bonus, and other total compensation. Regression coefficients for salary (S) and other total compensation (OC) are both significant in Tobin's Q and ROA models, and the signs of the coefficients are consistent. Salary and another total compensation have a negative coefficient respectively; Bonus is not significant both in regression model Tobin's Q and ROA models. Thus, it cannot be determined whether bonus has a relationship with firm performance.
The empirical results suggest that salary and other total compensation (e.g., severance payments and debt forgiveness) affect the firm performance negatively. The Tobin's Q model (table2, model 1) explain 14.00% of the variation of firm performance. A negative relationship between salary and firm performance is confirmed by this research for U.S. non-financial companies. The negative relationship presents the idea that paying top executives just being in the position does not increase firm value. Although salary represents a large proportion of total executive compensation in nonfinancial companies during 2008-2014, the results of this issue suggest that providing high salary to top executives does not align the interest of executives and shareholders, and, therefore, should be cautiously used.
Furthermore, the literature suggested a negative relationship between bonus and firm performance, the results of this issue otherwise. Reich (1993) suggested that managers, especially in the service industry, tend to focus more on short-term decisions than long-term. Solving short-term problems is a significant part of company's strategic, which can lead to long-term success. However, the findings of this issue show that using bonus has no effect on firm performance during 2008-2014 and bonuses account for the smallest part of an executive's revenue. Therefore, using bonuses for short-term achievements of non-financial U.S. firms cannot increase firm performance.
Equity-based compensation. Although the literature suggests that the equity-based compensation links management compensation to firm performance, the findings only partly support the second hypothesis. The Tobin's Q and ROA fixed-effect models show that the stock option awards are not significant contributors to U.S. non-financial firm performance after controlling firm characteristics. And restricted stocks are significant in Tobin's Q model that is positively related to firm performance. Thus, findings partly support the second hypothesis that the equity-based compensation (e.g., stock and options) provide positive incentives for top executives to increase their firm performance.
Previous studies found a significant relationship between equity-based compensation and firm performance (Mehran, 1995) . However, this research fails to observe the link between non-financial U.S. firm performance and stock options compensation. One of the possibilities is that the fluctuation of stock price does not depend on the effort of executives. Agency theory suggests that behavior-based compensation is positively tied to outcome uncertainty, while outcome-based compensation is negatively tied to outcome uncertainty. After the financial crisis, the stock performance fluctuates dramatically and the reason behind these fluctuations is unrelated to the top executive's efforts or firm's actual performance. Also, stock options can award executives in spite of their poor performance. Therefore, executives who are even in a poorly performed company can get average large profits, due to a temporary increase in stock price in a particular industry and market trend.
The results of this issue show that the restricted stock is a significant contributor to firm performance when using Tobin's Q model. Part of the reason is that recent legislation changes and trends in management compensation favour the use of restricted stock. Restricted stocks are restricted by exercise date. And they are exercisable after three to five years after granted and have tax advantages. The evidence of this issue shows that after 2008, the restricted stocks become the most popular compensation tool that accounts for a large proportion of the total compensation. Moreover, restricted stocks align the interests between executive and shareholders, which provide incentives for an executive to maximise firm value. Therefore, the popular use of restricted stock may provide a more incentive mechanism for top executives than stock options nowadays. 
Conclusion
This research provides the empirical evidence on the pay-performance relationship and analyses the incentive effect of both executive compensation level and structure on firm performance, based on tournament theory and agent theory. The existing empirical research on executive compensation lacks to analysis which type of equity-based compensation provides more incentive to managers. I investigate 828 non-financial firms during the fiscal year 2008-2014 which led to a database of 5976 observations. The finding of this research shows the evidence that the total compensation level has a significant positive effect on firm performance, as measured both by Tobin's Q and ROA. Further, the empirical results partly support the second hypothesis that the equity-based compensation provides positive incentives for top executives to increase their firm performance. In fact, the largest executive performance incentives come from restricted stocks; such holding is large and increasing. While stock options have little effect on firm performance, which is different from most of the previous empirical studies. Finally, although salary represents 27.66% percent of executive pay, such salary is awarded in ways that have a negative effect on firm performance.
Executive compensation represents a small part of the total firm value; however, the way how the compensation is structured can have significant effects on the added value that the executives bring to firm. The U.S. non-financial firms can use the findings from this study to adjust its executive compensation structure in order to align shareholder interests with executive's interests for the longterm performance. Firstly, the issue suggested that firm should use long-term incentive plans especially for restricted stocks and design the compensation system with the combination of shortterm and long-term incentive. Secondly, the income inequality is not tolerated in U.S. companies. In fact, higher total compensation level made company well-known and promote lower-level managers to work hard whose behaviors will increase firm value. Therefore, U.S. non-financial corporations can increase the compensation level of top executives which is a correct strategy to increase firm performance.
The purpose of this research is to analyze the incentive effect of compensation structure to firm performance. Thus, the empirical models do not fully reflect all other factors that influence firm performance. This leads to lower R^2 and lower overall explanatory power of the empirical model. It seems true that principal-agent consideration has a crucial influence on executive compensation, but many factors in the determination of compensation are unresolved.
An important area for future research focuses on investigating ownership-performance relationship. This issue does not find a link between options and firm performance, which may be due to some omitted variables. Since stock options and its relation to that of ownership is complicated, it is necessary to include ownership discussion when testing the incentive effect of stock options on firm performance.
